



JLMUN 2021 IMUNA Online International Conference

Study Guide: Arab League

Re-unifying Libya and ending the civil war in the country



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Welcome letter

Dear delegates,

It is a pleasure and a privilege to welcome you to our conference.

The following study guide is designed to get you better acquainted with the committee and the topic at hand, as well as useful links to assist you in your search for further material that will help you in your deliberations. This guide only serves as a basis for your research; and is intended as introductory only. It will NOT be enough to just read this study guide, and it is your responsibility to investigate further on the matters contained herein.

Please remember that you need to be well versed in the topic, and particularly in your country's position with regards to this topic. This will help you to maintain character and be ready to debate with the other delegates. The more information you acquire and the more knowledgeable that you are on the subject the more you will be able to influence the resolution drafting and writing process so that it will most accurately reflect your country's position and interests. It will also make your MUN experience all the more enjoyable for you and the other delegates. Your chairs are here to assist you should you face challenges either in your research or in writing your position paper.

We strongly believe that this is a unique opportunity to investigate a topic that has been going on for a long time but has not resulted in the media attention that Syria has (for example). Furthermore, territorial integrity, national unity and the role of various institutions is something that has been brought up in various ways many times over the years. As such, it is something worth thinking about. Apart from this, dealing with official documents will also help you understand which are authoritative, which will be a useful tool in your future research, both in academia and in your private sphere.

We look forward to reading your position papers and seeing you in the conference.

Asutosh Pattanyak and Moshe Asher Yehonatan Mitchell

Meet the Chairs

Chair - Ambassador Asutosh Pattanayak



Asutosh Pattanayak is currently serving as the Special Advisor to the International Human Rights High commissioner to India and Former United Nations IIMSAM Goodwill Youth Ambassador, he is also serving as the Youth Ambassador and Advisor to the Prime Minister of State of African Diaspora. Originally from Dubai, United Arab Emirates. His Excellency was recently awarded the Honorary Sheikh Zayed Peace Award (One of the highest civilian award in UAE) by His Royal Highness Sheikh Obaid Al Maktoum (Dubai Ruling Family) and His Excellency

Rashid Al Leem (Chairman of Sharjah Water and Electricity Authority) at the 4th Sheikh Zayed Peace and Tolerance Conference Dubai, as well as Young Leader Of The Year 2020 By the Middle East Youth Expo and Abu Dhabi Government. He has successfully represented UN IIMSAM at World Green Economy Summit, Raisina Dialogue and many more. He has also successfully carried out Diplomatic Bilateral Meetings with personalities such as the President of Afghanistan, Foreign Minister of Estonia, Foreign Minister of South Africa to name a few. A former UN Youth Representative and the Co-Founder of United Youth Circuit, a youth organisation which currently has members from over 70 different countries. He has also attended various Youth Circle and also organized one which is an initiative by the Ministry Of Youth UAE. Apart from this he is an Internationally renowned inspirational speaker and has successfully spoken in various types of youth conferences, SAM Global Conference and BIL Conference in over 15 different countries. He was recently featured by Voyage Magazine Based in Miami, Los Angeles, Atlanta and Dallas for his work towards United Nations and World Economy. He has even served as the Secretary-General of the Prestigious Arab Youth International MUN Dubai and also the Secretary General of World Youth Summit Dubai.



Vice-Chair- Moshe Asher Yehonatan Mitchell

Moshe is originally from Zimbabwe and made Aliyah from the UK 8.5 years ago. He is currently studying for his MA in Asian Studies in Haifa University. This is Moshe's third year in MUN. He has participated in conferences both nationally and internationally. Moshe is currently the President of HaiMUN. He looks forward to an interesting discussion during this conference.

Introduction

In December 2010, a protest started in Tunisia which toppled the government in what was called the “Jasmine Revolution”. This then set off a wave of protests across the Arab world that sought to change or overthrow long standing despotic regimes and monarchies. In Libya this morphed into a civil war, where many disparate actors banded together to fight against the Gadaffi regime. As the fighting intensified, international actors, including the Arab League, NATO and the UN Security Council, sought to ensure the safety of civilian populations who were assumed to be in danger of reprisal attacks by the Gadaffi army once the rebel held cities fell. This resulted in a “no-fly” zone being imposed over Libya, which reversed the tide of the civil war and resulted in the ouster of Colonel Gadaffi.

Failure to properly plan for the “day after the war” resulted in long-lasting disputes as to the legitimacy of the councils, commissions and governments that have sought to rule Libya after the war. This is further exacerbated by divergent views on the future of Libyan society, whether it is to be an Islamic or secular state, even while some groups maintain fealty to their tribal societies and not to the overall country. Elections in 2012 did nothing to alleviate these tensions, which bubbled into the surface in 2014, and since then the country has been effectively split into two major entities, one government sitting in Tripoli and the other in Tobruk. There have been other challengers, such as ISIS-affiliated groups that held territory in Libya in 2015-16.

Outright civil war again broke out in 2019 and the two sides (Tobruk and Tripoli) were pitted against one another, with international actors also divided between the factions. For example, Turkey, Qatar and most of the international community sided with Tripoli, whilst Egypt, Russia, the UAE and (according to some) France sided with Tobruk. This splits the Arab League, NATO and the UN Security Council. It will be this committee’s job to try and find a workable solution to an issue that has been going on for nearly 10 years. This will be difficult given the internal divisions in the country and in the League, such as religious (Sunni/Shia or theocratic/secular), wealth (rich/poor), ethnic, and political (democratic/autocratic) cleavages. Nevertheless, we believe that only a political solution will end this decade-long conflict and bring peace to the country.

Introduction to the Arab League

The Arab League (also known as the League of Arab States) was formed in Cairo on the 22nd March 1945 by Egypt, Transjordan (now Jordan), Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Since then, it has grown to include 22 states, including a Palestinian representative since 1976, and has 5 observer states (which do not hold voting privileges). Various countries have been suspended from the organization, such as Egypt following the peace accords with Israel (Reinstated in 1989), Libya under Gaddafi and Syria during the “Arab Spring” for their involvement in fighting against their own people. Libya has since been re-admitted, but Syria remains suspended.¹

According to Article 1 of the “Pact of the League of Arab States”, the founding document of the Arab League, “The League of Arab States shall be composed of the: independent Arab States that have signed this Pact.”² The Pact goes on to state the goals of the League, which envisions greater cooperation between the various states in order to ensure collaboration, and to safeguard the sovereignty and independence of the states. This led to some strife between members when Iraq invaded Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, amongst others, cooperated with the United States of America, and allowed the US to set up military bases in the country.³

Articles 3 and 7 are of particular interest as article 3 determines that each country shall have one vote, and article 7 states that any country that votes for a decision in the council will be bound by that decision. Other articles in the Pact set out the establishment of a Secretariat and budget and determine that the seat of the Arab League will be in Cairo, Egypt. The League ultimately envisions itself as the place that Arab countries that wish to address conflicts can turn to.⁴

Whilst military coalitions are not new in the Arab world, notably in the fight against Israel, there has been a push to create a Joint Arab Force (JAF) since 2015, in order to fight extremism. Being part of the JAF will be voluntary. It must be noted, though, that the differing military and social contexts of the various Arab countries may work against a united force being formed.⁵

¹ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Arab-League>

² https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp


³ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Arab-League>

⁴ https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp

⁵ <https://web.archive.org/web/20150713222118/https://chronicle.fanack.com/specials/league-arab-states/the-joint-arab-force-will-it-ever-work/>

History of the Topic

The Arab Spring started on the 18th December 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated following a police confiscation of the goods he was hawking. This set off protests in Tunisia that brought down the government of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. Following the success of the “Jasmine Revolution”, Egypt erupted in protests seeking the replacement of Hosni Mubarak who had been in power for 30 years. When this too was successful, protests continued to erupt in other states in North Africa and the Middle East where citizens sought to affect changes to their government.⁶



In Libya, this resulted in an all-out war as anti-Gaddafi forces saw this as the only option to end the nearly 42-year reign of Muammar Gaddafi. Whilst there were some initial victories for the rebel forces, by March 2011, concern was expressed that the Libyan army, which had remained loyal to

⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring>

Gadaffi, would overwhelm rebel held areas and use the rebellion as a pretext to target civilians. As such, NATO forces, backed by UN Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973, launched Operation Unified Protector which sought to limit the loss of civilian life in the fighting.⁷ By October 2011, Gaddafi's forces had been completely routed, and Gaddafi was killed near his stronghold in Sirte.⁸ It is noteworthy that the incursion by NATO forces into Libyan territory was actually requested by the Arab League, pointing to the low-regard Gaddafi was held by his compatriots.⁹

During the conflict, a Transitional National Council (TNC) was established, which was gradually accepted as the new governing body of Libya by international bodies. By September 2011, the TNC had taken over Tripoli and set about trying to form a functional government. Obama was to state that one of the biggest regrets of his presidency was not preparing for the post-Gaddafi era¹⁰. Given that the rebels had only been united in their desire to oust Gaddafi, there were problems getting some rebel groups to submit to the Council. Apart from this, there was also a level of distrust among some rebel groups over the past of some of the TNC officials, who had been officials in Gaddafi's regime. They were also unhappy about the composition of the TNC, which drew most of its officials from Eastern Libya, leaving other areas of Libya feeling under-represented. Elections were held in July 2012, and with the citizens selecting the 200-seat General National Congress (GNC), power was transferred from the Transitional Council to the Congress. Like the TNC before it, the GNC struggled to exert control over the country, with a nadir being the kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan by forces connected to the ministers of defense and the interior. Pressure was also brought to bear on the government through the disruption of oil pipelines and fields, which are the major source of government revenue in the country. All this was not helped by competing ideologies amongst the members of the GNC, ranging from Islamists who sought to enforce the wearing of hijabs by women in the universities and secularists who abhorred such moves.¹¹

By 2014, events came to a head when Khalifa Haftar led the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the "Operation Dignity", which sought to rout the Islamists and their allies in Eastern Libya, after he attacked the GNC for being dominated by Islamists. In an attempt to ease tensions, new elections were called for a body to be known as the House of Representatives, as the GNC's mandate had

⁷ https://web.archive.org/web/20120319203548/http://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/resources/24/Documents/UNSCR_1973.pdf

⁸ <https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring#ref1122528>

⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/Emergence-of-the-Transitional-National-Council-in-Benghazi>

¹⁰ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36013703>

¹¹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/Qaddafi-toppled-and-killed>

ended in February. Turnout was less than 20% as many people were disillusioned by what had transpired. Islamist parties had boycotted the election, and the Supreme Court then ruled that the HoR was unconstitutional. Islamists, now grouped in the Libya Dawn coalition, re-formed the GNC and renamed it the National Salvation Government (NSG). The NSG controls Tripoli, whilst the HoR sits in Tobruk under the protection of Haftar and his forces. Other institutions, including the Central Bank and the state-run oil company also splintered along factional lines. This break-down in unity allowed ISIS-affiliated groups to start infiltrating Libya. Whilst ISIS-affiliated forces had started arriving in 2014, it was in 2015 that they managed to secure a base in Sirte. In 2016, a Western led coalition arrived in the country to oust ISIS forces. They succeeded in doing this, however, splinter groups still remained active in the country.¹²




Image retrieved from:
https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2016-05-02-ISIS-in-Sirte_1200.gif


Meanwhile, in December 2015, representatives from the rival factions signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) which set up a

Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA was to be headed by a Prime Minister and include a presidential council of nine members drawn from around the country, and from different factions. Once again, whilst the international community, particularly the UN Security Council, recognized the GNA as the legitimate government, they were unable to consolidate power. The House of Representatives, which was still sitting in Tobruk, refused to endorse the ministerial appointments. In September 2017, the UN Support Mission in Libya wanted to amend the LPA so that it could be acceptable to all the factions, however Haftar's faction still refused to accept this solution. Nevertheless, work continued towards a resolution, which resulted in the acceptance of elections in 2019. Unfortunately, events would conspire to undo this agreement, noticeably when a framework for the elections was not met by the agreed deadline of September 2018. This was exacerbated by the

¹² ibid.

further splitting of the Central Bank and the oil companies into Eastern and Western branches, following the political and military split of the country.¹³

The international community, for their part, continued to trade exclusively with the National Oil Company (NOC) under control of the GNA in Tripoli. In November 2018, the Prime Minister, Fayeaz al-Sarraj of the GNA met with Haftar in Italy, which led to them reaffirming their commitment to holding elections the following year. In December, the NOC requested help due to armed militias taking over Al Sharara, Libya's largest oilfield. Haftar's LNA was able to remove the militias and handed control back to the NOC. Given that Haftar's forces control all the oilfields, it gives him some leverage over the GNA, whilst the GNA has the leverage over Haftar in that they have international legitimacy. This allowed a level of cooperation in the start of 2019, which had started to disintegrate by April with the postponement of a national unity conference. The LNA started a campaign in north-west Libya, ostensibly to combat militants, but with it seeming to head towards Tripoli, some wondered if the true agenda was to topple the GNA. Forces loyal to the GNA managed to hold back the LNA, resulting in a stalemate outside Tripoli for the rest of 2019. Foreign actors then became involved in the theatre of war, with Russia siding with the LNA and Turkey backing GNA



forces. A ceasefire, caused by pressure from Turkey and Russia, was declared on 12 January 2020, after LNA forces managed to capture the strategic city of Sirte. On 19 January, a conference in Berlin, aiming to reduce the conflict was unsuccessful, leading to the resumption of fighting. Both sides have tried to put pressure on the other side, either through questioning the legitimacy of the HoR, or by stopping the sale of oil through the NOC. In May and June, GNA forces, backed by Turkey, were able to end the siege of Tripoli and drive LNA forces back to Sirte. A revenue sharing agreement ended the blockade on NOC sales, which also allowed talks to resume in September 2020. October


¹³<https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/Qaddafi-toppled-and-killed>

saw the signing of a ceasefire agreement, and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country in three months.¹⁴

It is also important to note that both sides enjoy international support, even from members of the Arab League. Turkey, Italy and Qatar support the GNA, whilst Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates tend to support Haftar. France is suspected of having sympathies with Haftar, although

France denies this. This means that there is a split not only in the Arab League, but also in NATO.¹⁵

With that Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, President of Egypt, has been trying to bring unity to the country, as many Egyptians were employed in Libya before the fall of Gaddafi, also in order to secure Egypt's borders. However, the GNA seems skeptical about el-Sisi's intentions.¹⁶



¹⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya/Attempt-at-unity-Government-of-National-Accord>

¹⁵ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53863627>

¹⁶ <https://www.theafricareport.com/30672/crisis-in-libya-egypt-turns-to-arab-league-for-support-of-its-peace-deal/>

Current Situation

A major turning point in the conflict was the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) sponsored joint military commission talks in Geneva. On 21 October 2020, they announced that after 2 days of intensive talks by the 5+5, which were 5 representatives from each side of the conflict, there was agreement on opening up the country. This would allow traffic by road and by air between the various parts of the country. There was an agreement to cease inflammatory rhetoric, a call to maintain calm at the frontlines and a prisoner swap between the combatants. Lastly, an agreement to provide guards to the oil production sites to allow for the production of oil in the country was reached.¹⁷

This breakthrough in negotiations was followed by a ceasefire agreement reached on the 23rd of October 2020, which, among other things, called for the unification of Libya, the removal of all foreign fighters and the integration of all armed personnel into one army or disarmament. Furthermore, it called for the setting up of a “Command of the Security Operation Room” whose duties were to be defined by the parties but would broadly be in charge of maintaining free flow of civilians and oil along selected routes through the country. Lastly, the ceasefire sought to end political persecution. Of interest, the ceasefire specifically mentions that the ceasefire does not apply to UN designated terror groups on Libyan territory.¹⁸



On 25 October 2020, UNSMIL announced the start of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), which had its first virtual meeting on the 26th of October, and a direct in-person meeting on 9 November 2020 in Tunis. The LPDF is made up of 75 delegates drawn from both the HoR (Tobruk), the High Council of State (Tripoli) and actors that are not aligned to either faction. It is also meant to be inclusive of different geographical regions, tribal and ethnic groups, political affiliations and

¹⁷ <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/statement-acting-special-representative-secretary-general-libya-stephanie-williams-ongoing-libyan-55>

¹⁸ https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ceasefire_agreement_between_libyan_parties_english.pdf

social representation. The main aim of the LPDF is to encourage dialogue on the governance framework for the unified state, together with making preparations for democratic elections.¹⁹

The meetings held in October and November by the LPDF resulted in a framework that would allow Libya to hold elections on 24 December 2021. This date was picked as it will be the 70th anniversary of Libya's independence. They also outlined both the structure, the rights and the duties



of the Presidency Council and the Head of State.²⁰ The LPDF, in accordance with decisions made in Tunis in November 2020, has issued a call for candidates for the interim Presidency Council and Prime Minister, made up of a 3-member council, with each member of the council coming from a different region. Voting will take place in early February in Switzerland.²¹ As of 23 January 2021, the 5+5 Joint Military Committee has largely shown their commitment to the ceasefire agreement. Outstanding issues remaining include the opening of the coastal road between Abu Grein and Sirte and the repatriation of all foreign fighters and mercenaries.²²

¹⁹ <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/acting-special-representative-secretary-general-libya-stephanie-williams-announces-launch-libyan>

²⁰ <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/libyan-political-dialogue-forum>

²¹ <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/unsmil-announces-commencement-one-week-period-submission-candidacies-unified-executive-authority%C2%A0>

²² <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/unsmil-and-international-follow-committee-libya-security-working-group-reiterate-their-full-support>

Past Actions

In February 2011, the Arab League suspended Libya from participating in Arab League sessions, citing the violence against protestors as the reason for this suspension.²³ Following this, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1970 (2011) calling for the end to violence, an investigation into human rights abuses by the International Criminal Court, for an arms embargo to be placed on Libya and for sanctions on certain individuals to be enacted.²⁴ This was then followed up with a call by the Arab League for a “no-fly zone” to be enacted that would ensure the protection of civilians in Libya. Algeria and Syria voted against this motion, but with all the other countries in favor, it passed²⁵. In light of this, the UN Security council issued Resolution 1973 (2011), which reiterated the arms embargo, extended the sanctions to include planes belonging to either Libya or people connected with the regime and set out the parameters for the no-fly zone. These included military aircraft, but not aircraft containing humanitarian aid.²⁶

Following the ousting of Gaddafi, the UN set up a new body, namely the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) through UN Security Council Resolution 2009 (2011). Its mandate was to seek to ensure the rebuilding of the state after the conflict.²⁷ Its mandate has been updated on almost a yearly basis since then. Apart from setting up UNSMIL, the resolution also walks back some aspects of the arms embargo, unfreezes assets of the National Oil Company and lifts sanctions on other state-run companies.²⁸

In 2015, as mentioned above, many parties in Libya’s fractious political sphere came together in Skhirat, Morocco, to sign the Libyan Political Agreement, which was meant to end the conflict and set Libya onto the road of building a democratic and unified future.²⁹ This was further backed up by the UN Security Council Resolution 2259(2015), which expressed its encouragement of this

²³ <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-02-22/arab-league-bars-libya-from-meetings-citing-forces-crimes->

²⁴ [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1970%20\(2011\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1970%20(2011))

²⁵ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12723554>

²⁶ [https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1973%20\(2011\)](https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1973%20(2011))

²⁷ <https://archive.vn/20200117212038/https://unsmil.unmissions.org/mandate>

²⁸ [https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2009%20\(2011\)](https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2009%20(2011))

²⁹ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/12/518412-un-welcomes-historic-signing-libyan-political-agreement>

historical road to peace that the parties had embarked on. At the same time, the Security Council called for a continued crackdown on the ISIS affiliated groups operating in the country.³⁰

The UN Security Council Resolution 2486 (2019) not only referred back to its own past resolutions, but also “Recall[ed] the commitment of the Libyan parties to work constructively with the UN to organize credible and peaceful parliamentary and Presidential elections and to respect the results of these elections, as agreed by the Libyan parties in Paris in May 2018, in Palermo in November 2018, and in Abu Dhabi in February 2019” (ibid.). This shows a consistent effort played by several parties to try and reach agreement on the continuing instability in Libya. The Resolution reiterates that the GNA is the sole representative of the Libyan government (in effect excluding Haftar’s House of Representatives sitting in Tobruk) and calls for an arms embargo on combatants. The Resolution extends the mandate of UNSMIL.³¹

UN Security Council Resolution 2510 (2020) expresses its concern about the uptick in violence in Libya and reminds the international community that there are various mechanisms that are effectively still in place from the resolutions passed in 2011. These include arms embargoes and asset freezing that can still be used in order to put a damper on the violence engulfing the country.³² In July of that year, the Arab League called for an end to “foreign interference” in Libya, mainly targeting Turkish involvement in the conflict.³³ Resolution 2542 (2020) expressed hope that a lasting ceasefire could be agreed upon by all the parties³⁴, which would come to fruition, as mentioned above, during the Joint Military Commission talks in Geneva in September 2020. Since then, the Joint Military Commission and the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum have been meeting to try and reach agreements on the future of the country. The Arab League, for its part, has been involved in trying to help the country get back on its feet, and praised the positive developments that have been reached in the bid to bring stability to the country.³⁵

³⁰ [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2259%20\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2259%20(2015))

³¹ [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2486%20\(2019\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2486%20(2019))

³² <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3850557?ln=en>

³³ <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/89706/Arab-League-rejects-and-condemns-all-forms-of-interference-in>

³⁴ [https://undocs.org/s/res/2542%20\(2020\)](https://undocs.org/s/res/2542%20(2020))

³⁵ <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1798301/middle-east>

Summary

In this Study Guide, we have presented the Arab League, along with a history of the conflict that has been ongoing in the country since Gadaffi's ouster in 2011. Repeated attempts to build a stable and democratic Libya have been undermined by sectarian divisions in the country, as citizens place more importance to whether Libya should be a secular or religious state, and also claim greater fealty to their tribal or regional cleavages than to a national government.

The Arab League was able to gain broad based consensus over the use of force to protect civilians from forces loyal to Gadaffi during the 2011 civil war, but since then has failed to achieve a unified stance on what to do in Libya, as the tensions mentioned above affect many countries in the Arab world. For example, Egypt under Morsi would prefer a more religious Libya, whilst Egypt under al-Sisi tends to side with Haftar's secular and military government in Tobruk. Unfortunately for Egypt, the "International community", led by the UN Security Council, sees the Tripoli based government as the only legitimate government of the country. This puts various members of the Arab League at odds with the UN Security council.

In spite of the divisions within the Arab League, the UN has managed to push the two sides of the current conflict closer together through mediation via the UN Support Mission in Libya and the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum. Thus, whilst the Arab League has not been so involved in bringing about the current resolution to the conflict, support from regional actors will be necessary to ensure that the country is able to finally transition to a unified and stable state. It will also benefit countries, such as Egypt, who had thousands of Egyptians employed in the Libyan oilfields before the fall of Gadaffi and the subsequent chaos. Furthermore, it will also allow Arab states to close ranks against international actors, such as Turkey, which is trying to gain a foothold in Libya with a gas pipeline.

Guiding Questions

- 1) One of the features of Libyan life post-Gaddafi has been the issue of legitimacy, what policies do you propose would help Libya maintain its international legitimacy?
- 2) Another feature has been the inability of the “legitimate” government to effect control over the entire territory, how can you help with this?
- 3) Civilians have often been at the mercy of fighting forces, what, if any, justice or assistance do you propose for the people that have been hurt by past fighting?
- 4) Various foreign powers have been involved in the fighting in Libya, to some extent using Libya as a place to map out their own internal ideologies (think Islamist vs Secular ideologies). As such, how do your proposals allow the people of Libya to map out their own destiny?
- 5) Nearly all the resolutions mentioned in this Study Guide mention that women need to be involved in the decisions facing the country. How would you ensure that this happens?
- 6) Which country (or countries), interests, or groups are most affected by the Libya situation outside of Libya? The bordering countries are the most obvious example; however, Libya has large oil reserves, it had ISIS-affiliated groups holding territory in the country and it was an active member in pan-African projects. Thus, Libyan influence may not be so obvious at first glance.
- 7) How does the situation in Libya affect your country? How will Libya’s political destiny affect the politics in your country? For example, will a secular and democratic Libya call for changes in your country? Conversely will an Islamic theocratic state create momentum for similar changes in your country?
- 8) How does the current chaos in Libya affect the perception of Arab states in the international sphere? For example, the chaos allows for many African migrants and asylum seekers to find passage to the EU through the territory. Also, some of these migrants have been documented being sold in slave markets, which also casts Arab states in a negative light.

Further Reading

Arab League Homepage (Arabic): <http://www.lasportal.org/Pages/Welcome.aspx>

Caspian Report on Turkish interests in Libya: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCpL9JATq9I>

Ceasefire Agreement between GNA and LNA:

https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ceasefire_agreement_between_libyan_parties_english.pdf

Egypt calling on the Arab League: <https://www.theafricareport.com/30672/crisis-in-libya-egypt-turns-to-arab-league-for-support-of-its-peace-deal/>

Encyclopedia Britannica: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011>

Pact of the Arab League: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp

UN Security Council Resolution 1970: [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1970%20\(2011\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1970%20(2011))

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Country List

Algeria

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Iraq

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Lebanon

Libya

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Morocco

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Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Somalia

Sudan

Syria

Tunisia

United Arab Emirates

Yemen

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